National Tribune.

"To care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and orphans."

ESTABLISHED 1877—NEW SERIES. WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1897.—TWELVE PAGES. VOL. XVII—NO. 8—WHOLE NO. 854.

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

THREE DAYS FIGHTING

Magnificent Stand of the First Corps.

SECOND DAY'S STRUGGLE

The Rebels Fought to a Standstill on the Right and Left.

THIRD DAY—PICKETT'S CHARGE

Deadly Struggle Resulting in the Destruction of Pickett's Column.

THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT.

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSburg opened July 1, 1863, unexpectedly to both commanders, by an advance of Gen. Harry Heth's Division of the rebel army, to Gettysburg, to secure some shoes which had been sent thither for the Army of the Potomac.

Heth encountered, first, Buford's cavalry skirmishers, and then his entire division, which fought obstinately against overwhelming numbers, to gain time for the First Corps to come up. Gen. Reynolds, commanding the Right Wing of the Army of the Potomac, had ridden forward at the sound of the firing, and ascended the cupola of the Lutheran Theological Seminary, which commanded a view of the field. He decided to give battle right there, and descending, hurried forward the First Corps and placed it in position.

Then ensued a struggle which has no parallel in the history of warfare. The First Corps brought about 10,000 men on to the field, and although the rebels in a little while massed 30,000 against them, they fought with an obstinacy never surpassed on any field. They never gave ground, until the too-long thin line of the Eleventh Corps on their left was pierced, and their own flank was enveloped. Then the remnant of the Corps retired sullenly and doggedly. Out of the 10,000 which they had carried into the fight they had lost 6,000—the heaviest proportion of loss ever sustained by so large a body of troops. Gen. Reynolds was killed, and other prominent officers slain or desperately wounded. But they had gotten full pay from the enemy for every man they had lost. Two rebel brigades had been captured, and every portion of the attacking force had suffered such appalling loss that it was in no mood to pursue the battle farther.

The First and Eleventh Corps fell back to Cemetery Ridge and established themselves there. Gen. Hancock had been sent forward by Gen. Meade to learn the situation of affairs, and decide whether the battle was to be fought out at Gettysburg or the forces should concentrate at Pipe Creek, 15 miles in the rear. Hancock decided to fight there, and Meade ordered the rest of the army to march with all possible speed to Gettysburg.

THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE.

All the night of July 1 and the day of July 2 the men of the Army of the Potomac were hurrying forward from Taneytown, Emmitsburg, Two Taverns, Manchester, and other points. By noon of July 2 nearly the whole army was up, and aligned on Cemetery Ridge.

Lee, too, had been hurrying forward his men and placing them in position on Seminary Ridge, about a mile distant from the Union line. The terrible losses he had sustained the day before made him cautious about attacking, and he had to have other troops than those which had been so badly pounded to make an assault with any hopes of success.

He massed Longstreet's men behind a curtain of woods on our left to overwhelm the advanced Third Corps and seize the Round Tops, which would give him command of the Taneytown road and our rear.

At the same time his extreme left was to attack our extreme right on Culp's Hill, and so both flanks of our army would be doubled back on one another.

The attack on Sickles's Third Corps began about 4 o'clock, and the fighting became terrific at once in the Peach Orchard, the Wheatfield, and around the Round Tops. At the outset the rebels had immensely superior forces at the point of attack, but the Third Corps resisted so gallantly that time was gained to hurry portions of the Fifth, Second and Twelfth Corps to their assistance. The Round Tops were saved, but Sickles's line was forced back, and Ewell gained an advantageous position on Culp's Hill, which had been vacated by the Twelfth Corps when it went to the assistance of the Third Corps. When the Twelfth Corps returned it recovered its position, and inflicted a terrible loss upon Johnson's Division of Ewell's Corps, which attempted to hold it.

All this fighting caused appalling losses to our men, but the rebels suffered still more severely, since they were the attacking party.

The 2d of July closed with our army hammered into a good, compact position, with the rebel army enveloping it at an average distance of one mile. Thus the two armies lay during the morning of July 3.

THE THIRD DAY—PICKETT'S CHARGE.

Though Lee's army had been terribly shattered by the fierce fighting, he still had a large body of troops which had been to the rear, guarding trains, and not engaged. With these he resolved to make one more desperate effort to gain the battle on which so much depended. If he could win a victory on the soil of Pennsylvania, the independence of the Southern Confederacy would be secured. Repulsed on both our flanks, he resolved to make a supreme effort against our center.

He spent the morning of the 3d in preparing for this. He massed 150 cannon to beat upon the center, and prepare for the infantry attack. Gen. Hunt, Chief of Artillery, saw this, and promptly arrayed 80 guns—all that the space would accommodate, to reply.

Longstreet put Pickett's fresh division to the front, and increased his force by every available man, until he had from 15,000 to 18,000 fresh, vigorous troops, the flower of the Army of Northern Virginia, and who were full of enthusiasm as to what they would accomplish. They were sanguine of more than repeating the successes of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.

Lee's preparations were finished by 1 o'clock, and the signal guns were fired which opened the most terrible cannonade that had been known up to that time. The rebel guns concentrated their fire upon the left center of the long Union line, and filled the air with howling missiles.

Our infantry hugged the ground, and sought shelter from the awful storm behind stone walls, clumps of ground, and everything that would afford the least protection. They suffered comparatively little, but there was frightful havoc among the artillerymen, the horses of officers, ambulances, etc.

Gen. Meade's Headquarters were directly in range, and the fire there became so hot that he was forced to leave them, and take up his headquarters with Gen. Slocum.

The 80 guns in the Union center responded, and were assisted by those on Little Round Top and Cemetery Hill. After two hours of this infernal din Gen. Hunt ordered the Union guns in the center to stop, cool off, fill up the limbers with canister, and prepare for the infantry charge which the cannonade heralded. The rebels thought that the Union batteries had been silenced, and Pickett received the order to move forward. When his army moved out of the cover of the woods upon the open fields it was the most magnificent display of soldiership the Army of the Potomac had witnessed by its old-time enemy. In lines as well-dressed as on parade, the dust-brown host swept forward, regardless of the storm of shells which the Union artillery, from all parts, sent tearing through the ranks.

Pickett had been given as his objective a clump of trees near Hancock's center, and he directed his march steadily upon it. The outlying Union skirmishers delivered their fire in the face of the line, and ran back to their regiments. Stannard's Brigade of Vermonters—nine months men—lay in a ravine to Pickett's right, and in advance of the Union main line. Its commander had the soldiership to perceive that here was his great opportunity, and he maintained his position. Similarly, the 8th Ohio was out on picket on Pickett's left.

Pickett moved steadily forward, until he came in musket and canister range, and then a storm burst upon him that tore his well-ordered ranks to tatters. But this did not stop his decimated legions. They drove straight forward, their officers gallantly leading. Armistead, commanding the leading brigade, with his hat on his sword, struck the stone wall in front of the Philadelphia Brigade, and Cushing's and Brown's batteries. He leaped over the wall, and shouted to his men, "Give them the cold steel, boys," and laid his hand on one of the cannon. At that instant, Col. Norman J. Hall led two regiments to the assistance of the Philadelphia Brigade. There was a terrific hand-to-hand fight around the guns. Armistead was shot down, and fell, dying beside the bodies of the gallant Cushing and his cannoneers.

In the meanwhile, Stannard's Brigade had risen from its covert, and advancing upon Pickett's flank, opened an awful enfilading fire. The 8th Ohio did the same on his left flank. The 12th N. J., armed with caliber 65 muskets, firing a large ball and three buckshot, was mowing down everything in range. Union soldiers were crowding to every available point of vantage, and adding their quota to the devouring fires. In a few terrible minutes there was only a remnant of the proud host which had advanced so confidently a little while before. Less than one third of Pickett's Division succeeded in getting back to Seminary Ridge. The remainder was either killed, wounded, or prisoners. Every brigade commander was killed or wounded, and the slaughter of the subordinate officers was proportionately heavy.

Just how many were killed and wounded will never be known. It was the policy of the rebel reports to minimize their losses to the last degree.

While this was going on the cavalry were not idle. Kilpatrick sent in Farnsworth's and Merritt's Brigade on a desperate charge on Longstreet's right to draw off some of his forces. Farnsworth was killed, and the cavalry badly cut up, but it had the effect desired. Stuart attacked our cavalry, three miles to the right of the line, with a view of getting in our rear, and adding to the defeat if Pickett should succeed. He was met by D. McM. Gregg and Custer, and a savage fight ensued, which resulted in Stuart's repulse.

While lying wounded, Hancock urged Meade to make a counter-attack, which would destroy the rebel army, but the prudent Meade decided to let well enough alone.

COMPARED WITH FREDERICKSBURG.

Pickett's charge has been eulogized and painted as the most phenomenal exhibition of courage and soldiership during the whole war.

As a matter of fact it shrinks greatly by comparison with the assault of the Second and Fifth Corps on Marye's Hights, Dec. 13, 1862.

The differences may be briefly summarized thus:

1. Pickett charged over clear, open ground against a line which had no other shelter than that offered by casual fences and stone walls. His front was unusually free from such obstacles as usually impede the progress of an assaulting column. He could not have found a fairer field for operations in the world. It is said that our men were standing on a ridge. The truth is that at that point the ridge sinks down until the rise in the approach to it is hardly visible.

2. Pickett's charge had been prepared for by the most terrific artillery fire ever known concentrated at most effective cannon range on the objective of his assault.

3. There was very much to give Pickett's men strong hopes of success. The Army of the Potomac had been terribly pounded for two days, and its flanks forced back far from their original positions.

4. On the other hand, the men of the Second and Fifth Corps assailed a perfectly fresh enemy standing in a position which had no superior for natural strength in any battlefield in the history of the world. It was a perfect fortress, and could scarcely have been made stronger. It was impossible for our artillery to give more than a feeble assistance.

5. The dullest man in the Army of the Potomac realized something if not all of this, and that the assault could have little chance of succeeding. Yet they made an attack that could not be surpassed for desperate determination. They did not go to pieces in one assault as Pickett's men did, but made six different charges, and despite the slaughter forced themselves forward to within 100 yards of the base of the impregnable fortress. In Hancock's Division of the Second Corps, 2,013 men were lost out of a total of 5,006. Eight regiments—numbering 2,548—lost 1,324, or an average of 54 per cent. Not one of these lost less than 45 per cent., and one lost 67 per cent., or two-thirds.

The only consolation that we had for the loss of 15,000 men at Fredericksburg was the poor one of forcing upon the rebels the conviction that we would attack them wherever found, no matter what the strength of their position and defenses.

In every element of unflinching, fiery gallantry the charge at Fredericksburg towers high above the much-vaunted Pickett's assault at Gettysburg.

LOSSES IN THE ENTIRE BATTLE.

The losses on both sides amounted to about 23,000 each. The Union Army had about 4,000 killed or mortally wounded, over 11,000 wounded, and 6,645 captured. One corps commander was killed, and three corps commanders wounded. Four brigade commanders were killed.

It will never be known how many rebels were killed, but 7,262 wounded prisoners were left in our hands, besides 6,359 unwounded; making 13,621 in all. They had three Generals killed, 13 wounded, and one captured. They lost 41 flags and three cannon.



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GETTYSBURG.
Pickett's Charge.



POSITIONS ON THE THIRD DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

Andersonville:

A Story of Rebel Military Prisons.

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SYNOPSIS OF PRECEDING CHAPTERS.

The wonderful country about Cumberland Gap, and the strategic importance of that place. Need of food and forage for the garrison sends a battalion of cavalry up Powell's Valley to secure its supplies. A rebel command starts down the valley. The two forces meet and the rebels are routed.

The cavalry battalion occupies the country gained, and protects the forage trains sent out to gather up the supplies. On Jan. 3, 1864, the battalion is attacked by Jones's Brigade of rebels, and after a stubborn, desperate fight is compelled to surrender. The prisoners are taken to Richmond. Interior and exterior scenes in Richmond. Stoppage of exchange.

The first squad of prisoners leave for Andersonville. Gen. Winder and Capt. Wirz take charge of the Prison.

The month of March is passed in the pen, with little shelter from the snow, rain, and wind. The prison fills up with additional squads. Prisoners plagued by vermin. Trading with guards.

The prisoners' minds are bent on exchange or escape. Much time devoted to tunnel-digging. The crowd inside the prison rapidly increases, rations grow worse, the misery intensifies, and there is an appalling increase in the mortality.

Plundering prisoners, known as Raiders, attempt the murder of Leroy L. Key, who forms a band of Regulators. The latter defeat the Raiders in a terrible battle. The Raider leaders are arrested, and at a court-martial of the prisoners six are sentenced to death. The Raiders hanged amid intense excitement. The executions are followed by organization of a strong police force among the prisoners.

The author interpolates in his narrative a transcript of the evidence at the Wirz trial of Prof. Joseph Jones, a Surgeon of high rank in the rebel army, who visited Andersonville to make a scientific study of the conditions of disease there.

The horrors of August. The Providential Spring. The food, its meagerness and inferior quality. The escape, race with bloodhounds and recapture of the author and a companion. Fall of Atlanta. Announcement of a general exchange.

The author, with others, leaves for Savannah. They are disappointed to find they are not to be exchanged, but confined in the Savannah prison-pen. The prisoners are taken to Millen, and receive better treatment.

CHAPTER LXII.

SERG'T LEROY L. KEY—HIS ADVENTURES SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXECUTION—ATTEMPTS TO ESCAPE—IS RECAPTURED AND TAKEN TO MACON—ESCAPES FROM THERE, BUT IS COMPELLED TO RETURN—IS FINALLY EXCHANGED AT SAVANNAH.

Leroy L. Key, the heroic Sergeant of Co. M, 16th Ill. Cav., who organized and led the Regulators at Andersonville in their successful conflict with and defeat of the Raiders, and who presided at the execution of the six condemned men on the 11th of July, furnished, at the request of the author, the following story of his prison career subsequent to that event:

"On the 12th day of July, 1864, the day after the hanging of the six Raiders, by the urgent request of many friends (of whom you were one), I sought and obtained from Wirz a parole for myself and the six brave men who assisted as executioners of those desperados. It seemed that you were all fearful that we might, after what had been done, be assassinated if we remained in the Stockade; and that we might be overpowered, perhaps, by the friends of the Raiders we had hanged, at a time possibly when you would not be on hand to give us assistance, and thus lose our lives for rendering the help we did in getting rid of the worst pestilence we had to contend with.

"On obtaining my parole I was very careful to have it so arranged and mutually understood, between Wirz and myself, that at any time that my squad (meaning the survivors of my comrades, with whom I was originally captured) was sent away from Andersonville, either to be exchanged or to go to another prison, I should be allowed to go with them.

"This was agreed to, and so written in my parole, which I carried until it absolutely wore out. I took a position in the cook-house, and the other boys either went to work there, or at the hospital, or grave-yard, as occasion required. I worked here, and did the best I could for the many starving wretches inside, in the way of preparing their food, until the 8th day of September, at which time, if you remember, quite a train load of men were removed, as many of us thought, for the purpose of exchange; but, as we afterwards discovered, to be taken to another prison.

"Among the crowd so removed was my squad, or, at least, a portion of them, being my intimate mess-mates while in the Stockade. As soon as I found this to be the case I waited on Wirz at his office, and asked permission to go with them, which he refused, stating that he was compelled to have men at the cook-house to cook for those in the Stockade until they were all gone or exchanged.

"I reminded him of the condition in my parole, but this only had the effect of making him mad, and he threatened me with the stocks if I did not go back and resume work. I then and there made up my mind to attempt my escape, considering that the parole had first been broken by the man that granted it.

"On inquiry after my return to the cook-house, I found four other boys who were also planning an escape, and who were only too glad to get me to join them, and take charge of the affair. Our plans were well laid and executed, as the sequel will prove, and in this particular my own experience in the endeavor to escape from Andersonville is not entirely dissimilar from yours, though it had different results.

"I very much regret that in the attempt I lost my penciled memorandum, in which it was my habit to chronicle what went on around me daily, and where I had the names of my brave comrades who made the effort to escape with me. Unfortunately, I cannot now recall to memory the name of one of them, or remember to what commands they belonged.

"I knew that our greatest risk was run in eluding the guards, and that in the morning we should be compelled to cheat the blood-hounds. The first we managed to do very well, not without many hairbreadth escapes, however; but we did succeed in getting through both lines of guards, and found ourselves in the densest pine forest I ever saw.

"We traveled, as nearly as we could judge, due north all night until daylight. From our fatigue and bruises, and the long hours that had elapsed since 8 o'clock, the time of our starting, we thought we had come not less than 12 or 15 miles. Imagine our surprise and mortification, then, when we could plainly hear the reveille, and almost the Sergeant's voice calling the roll, while the answers of "Here!" were perfectly distinct. We could not possibly have been more than a mile, or a mile-and-a-half at the farthest, from the Stockade.

"Our anxiety and mortification were doubled when at the usual hour—as we supposed—we heard the well-known and long-familiar sound of the hunter's horn, calling his hounds to their accustomed task of making the circuit of the Stockade, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not any "Yankee" had had the audacity to attempt an escape. The hounds, anticipating, no doubt, this usual daily work, gave forth glad barks of joy at being thus called forth to duty.

"We heard them start, as was usual,

(Continued on third page.)

MEMOIRS OF GEN. WM. T. SHERMAN.

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF.

THE INDIAN QUESTION

How the Peace or Quaker Policy Originated.

GRANT MADE PRESIDENT.

Grand Reunion of Four Great Armies at Chicago.

SHERMAN AS GENERAL-IN-CHIEF

Gen. Rawlins Serves a Short Term as Secretary of War.

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CHAPTER XXVI—(*continued*).

A PART OF OUR GENERAL plan was to organize the two great reservations into regular Territorial Governments, with Governor, Council, Courts, and civil officers. Gen. Harney was temporarily assigned to that of the Sioux, at the north, and Gen. Hazen to that of the Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, etc., at the south, but the patronage of the Indian Bureau was too strong for us, and that part of our labor failed.

Still, the Indian Peace Commission of 1867-'68 did prepare the way for the great Pacific Railroads, which, for better or worse, have settled the fate of the buffalo and Indian forever. There have been wars and conflicts since with these Indians up to a recent period too numerous and complicated in their details for me to unravel and record, but they have been the dying struggles of a singular race of brave men fighting against destiny, each less and less violent, till now the wild game is gone, the whites too numerous and powerful; so that the Indian question has become one of sentiment and charity, but not of war.

The peace, or "Quaker," policy, of which so much has been said, originated about thus: By the act of Congress approved March 3, 1869, the 45 regiments of infantry were reduced to 25, and provision was made for the "muster out" of many of the surplus officers, and for retaining others to be absorbed by the usual promotions and casualties.

On the 7th of May of that year, by authority of an act of Congress approved June 30, 1834, nine field officers and 59 Captains and subalterns were detached and ordered to report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to serve as Indian Superintendents and Agents.

Thus by an old law surplus Army officers were made to displace the usual civil appointees, undoubtedly a change for the better, but most distasteful to members of Congress, who looked to these appointments as part of their proper patronage. The consequence was the law of July 15, 1870, which vacated the military commission of any officer who accepted or exercised the functions of a civil officer.

I was then told that certain politicians called on President Grant, informing him that this law was chiefly designed to prevent his using Army officers for Indian agents, "civil offices," which he believed to be both judicious and wise; Army officers, as a rule, being better qualified to deal with Indians than the average political appointees. The President then quietly replied:

"Gentlemen, you have defeated my plan of Indian management; but you shall not succeed in *your* purpose, for I will divide these appointments up among the religious churches, with which you dare not contend." The Army officers were consequently relieved of their "civil offices," and the Indian agencies were apportioned to the several religious churches in about the proportion of their supposed strength—some to the Quakers, some to the Methodists, to the Catholics, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, etc., etc.

The Quakers, being first named, gave name to the policy.

As was clearly foreseen, Gen. U. S. Grant was duly nominated, and on the 7th of November, 1868, was elected President of the United States for the four years beginning with March 4, 1869.

On the 15th and 16th of December, 1868, the four societies of the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, Ohio, and Georgia held a joint Reunion at Chicago, at which were present over two thousand of the surviving officers and soldiers of the war. The ceremonies consisted of the joint meeting in Crosby's magnificent Opera-House, at which Gen. George H. Thomas presided. Gen. W. W. Belknap was the orator for the Army of the Tennessee, Gen. Charles Cruft for the Army of the Cumberland, Gen. J. D. Cox for the Army of the Ohio, and Gen. William Cogswell for the Army of Georgia.

The banquet was held in the vast Chamber of Commerce, at which I presided.

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